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Risk transfer is a key risk and capital management tool for insurance companies.
Transferring risk between insurers is used to mitigate risk and manage capital re-
quirements. We investigate risk transfer in the context of a network environment of
insurers and consider capital costs and capital constraints at the level of individual
insurance companies. We demonstrate that the optimisation of profitability across
the network can be achieved through risk transfer. Considering only individual in-
surance companies, there is no unique optimal solution and, a priori, it is not clear
which solutions are fair. However, from a network perspective, we derive a unique
fair solution in the sense of cooperative game theory. Implications for systemic risk
are briefly discussed.
Keywords risk transfer, risk-based capital, reinsurance, return optimisation,
conditional expected shortfall
JEL classification G13, G22, D85, C57, C71
1 Introduction
Insurance companies can transfer their risk to other entities, for example reinsurance
companies, to mitigate loss potential and reduce the cost of capital. For a single
insurance company optimising risk transfer is straightforward as it means to compare
the price for risk transfer to its benefits in terms of mitigated losses and reduced cost
of risk capital. For a network of insurers, however, the optimisation can take different
perspectives and therefore the meaning of optimising risk transfer in a network is not
clear. In this article, we investigate risk transfer in the context of a network of insurance
companies. We use a general framework with passive and active reinsurance, that means
insurers can transfer their risk to reinsurance companies and also between themselves.
We take an economic point of view and consider capital costs and capital constraints
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at the level of individual insurers. A key result is that while there is no unique solution
optimising risk transfer for all insurance companies at the individual level, there exists a
unique, fair and optimal solution in the sense of cooperative game theory if the network
perspective is adopted.
Optimal risk sharing between insurance and reinsurance companies has been considered
by various authors. Research either takes the perspective of individual entities [10, 17,
7] or, more recently, insurance groups [21, 18, 23, 15, 5]. Because of the ownership
structure and related transparency of risk exposures, an optimisation of risk transfer
for insurance groups can start from the comprehensive group standpoint. Related
research results are not only relevant for the economics of insurance groups but also for
insurance supervision and regulation. Indeed, recent findings point towards a significant
impact of regulatory frameworks on optimising risk transfer and systemic risk as for
example discussed by A. Asimit, A. Badescu, and A. Tsanakas [4]. Our starting point
in this paper differs in the sense that we do not assume a group structure but consider
risk transfer across a network of insurers. Optimal risk transfer thus is not considered
from an overarching insurance group perspective but from the perspective of a network
of individual insurers and game theory.
Risk transfer across a network of insurance companies has been considered by other
authors as well. For example, A.-M. Hamm, T. Knispel, and S. Weber [16] show that
risk transfer can significantly decrease overall capital requirements when using Value
at Risk based risk measures. Other approaches aim to minimise the aggregated risk in
a system by redistributing its components across participating agents, see for example
the work of F.-B. Liebrich and G. Svindland [22] for an acceptance set based approach.
A utility based framework has been suggested by F. Biagini, A. Doldi, J.-P. Fouque,
M. Frittelli, and T. Meyer-Brandis [6].
The paper builds in part on the work of N. Ettlin [14] and generalises results on optimi-
sation of risk transfer for two insurers as discussed by A. Kull [20] to multiple insurers.
Furthermore, it draws a connection to cooperative game theory and related concepts
of capital allocation as developed by M. Denault [12].
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review monetary risk mea-
sures and define the Conditional Expected Shortfall. Furthermore, we explain the
notion of risk capital, capital costs, capital allocation, risk aggregation, and related
economics. In Section 3, we draw links between these concepts and risk transfer by in-
troducing a network of insurance companies. We define the optimisation of risk transfer
for individual insurance companies and the network in Section 4. We discuss that there
is no unique optimal solution without further constraints. However, using principles
from cooperative game theory we can identify a unique and in that sense fair solution to
the optimisation of risk transfer. The paper concludes with a discussion of implications
for insurance groups and the systemic risk debate in Section 6.
2 Economics of risk transfer
The inherent uncertainty of the future as it manifests itself, for example in uncertain loss
experience, is usually referred to as risk. Mathematically, the impact of the uncertainty
of the future is described by random variables. To this end, let (Ω,F ,P) denote a
probability space. Let X be some real topological vector space equipped with an
2
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appropriate preorder ≤. For us X is a subset of L0(Ω,F ,P), the space of all equivalence
classes with respect to P-a.s. equality of measurable maps from (Ω,F) to R with its
Borel σ-algebra. Since we will work with Expected Shortfall, we will usually choose
X = Lp(Ω,F ,P), for p ∈ [1,∞]. Furthermore, we will work with continuous random
variables.
2.1 Measuring risk
Risk measures quantify the risk of a financial position. They are functionals ρ : X → R
with X 7→ ρ(X). P. Artzner, F. Delbaen, J. Eber and D. Heath [3] introduce four
axioms a practicable risk measure should fulfil and define what is known as coherent
risk measures on the space of bounded random variables. F. Delbaen [11] extends the
concept of coherent risk measures to general probability spaces. We will adapt the
framework of A. J. McNeil, R. Frey, and P. Embrechts [24] and define risk measures
on random variables which represent losses. This means that for our risk measures
losses are positive. Notice that therefore the four coherency axioms differ slightly from
the ones in [3]. In particular, instead of decreasing monotonicity we have increasing
monotonicity, and for L ∈ X , ` ∈ R the translation property reads ρ(L+ `) = ρ(L) + `.
In the following, we will use the (right-tail) Expected Shortfall or Tail Value at Risk as
the coherent risk measure.1 For a loss L with E[|L|] < ∞ the Expected Shortfall at a







where VaRβ : X → R denotes the Value at Risk at a probability level β. The Value
at Risk of a loss random variable L with continuous and strictly increasing cumulative
distribution function FL : R→ [0, 1] is given by its inverse, VaRα(L) = F−1L (α).2 It can
be shown, see for example [24, Lemma 2.16], that in this case, the Expected Shortfall
coincides with the Conditional Value at Risk, which is defined as the expectation of L
conditioned on that L exceeds its Value at Risk at level α,
ESα(L) = CVaRα(L) = E[L | L ≥ VaRα(L)] .
Notice that in general, this equation does not hold for discontinuous loss distributions as
described in [24, Remark 2.17] and proved by C. Acerbi and D. Tasche [1] in Proposition
3.2. We will use this equality to draw a connection to the related conditional risk
measure termed Conditional Expected Shortfall CESα,Y . It is defined as the expectation
of L conditioned on another loss random variable Y at a probability level α,
CESα,Y (L) = E[L | Y ≥ VaRα(Y )] .
This conditional risk measure is favourable due to its properties, in particular, its
additivity which allows for an additive and consistent allocation of risk and capital. A
wider context is given by G. Venter [27].
1For a proof that the Expected Shortfall is indeed coherent see for example [24, Proposition 6.9].
2For more details see for example [24, Definition 2.10, Definition 2.12].
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2.2 Risk capital and capital costs
For insurance companies capital provides protection against insolvency or ruin due
to large unexpected losses. Insurers hold certain amounts of capital, termed risk-
based capital, in order to ensure the ability to sustain significant, unexpected losses.
Determining the risk-based capital for a specific risk is usually done by applying risk
measures. For instance, the supervisory framework of Solvency II prescribes the usage
of Value at Risk and the Swiss Solvency Test of Expected Shortfall as risk measures
for calculating regulatory capital requirements.
The exact definition of risk-based capital and the different ways to calculate it is a
widely discussed topic. Definitions depend on scopes ranging from regulatory aspects
to company-internal capital management and performance measurement. Considering
a portfolio with underwriting profits reflected by the random variable X ∈ X and a
coherent risk measure ρ, the risk-based capital corresponding to the portfolio X is given
by
RBC(X) = ρ(−X) .
Notice that since X represents returns, we use −X inside the risk measure. Holding
capital comes at a cost proportional to the amount of risk-based capital,
C(X) = ηRBC(X) ,
where the cost of capital rate η ∈ (0, 1) depends on various factors. These factors
include the capital structure of the company, the type and riskiness of the business,
and other specificities. The cost of capital rate η for an insurer typically lies in the
range of 4% to 15%, see for example the cost of capital study by KPMG [19]. Any
meaningful economic analysis of the economics of insurance and risk transfer should
take this cost of capital into account.
We consider now the case of a simplified non-life insurer that underwrites short-tail
business over a single time period. Neglecting the cost of capital, the net underwriting
profit is given by
U = P − L ,
where P stands for the premium income and L for the accumulated gross loss amount.
To keep things simple, consider the premium P ≥ 0 to be a constant. The underwriting
profit Z, after including the cost of capital, is defined as
Z = U − C(Z) = U − ηRBC(Z) = U − ηρ(−Z) . (2.1)
Here, RBC(Z) stands for the amount of capital allocated to support the risk related to
Z.
In general, insurance companies hold risk-based capital only up to a probability cor-
responding to a company-specific risk appetite level α or regulatory requirements and
not to the full range of potential adverse results. For example, the Swiss Solvency Test
prescribes α = 0.99. Furthermore, the determination of the risk-based capital RBC(Z)
also depends on the situation relative to which it is defined.
4
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Lemma 2.1. The recursive formula for Z in Equation (2.1) can be explicitly stated as
Z = U − η
1− η
ρ(−U) .
Proof. Inserting Z itself in Equation (2.1) and using the translation property of ρ, we
get the identity Z = U − ηρ(−U) − η2ρ(−Z). Writing U = ηU + (1 − η)U and then
using Equation (2.1) again, we arrive at
Z = (1− η)U − ηρ(−U) + η(U − ηρ(−Z)) = (1− η)U − ηρ(−U) + ηZ .
Solving for Z concludes the proof.
Hence, to calculate the risk-based capital of Z we apply the risk measure to −Z and
















We will assume capital costs η and risk appetite levels α to be fixed. Both of these
assumptions are significant simplifications which, however, can be motivated by similar
regulatory constraints.
Remark 2.2. Notice that we can use the recursive formula in Equation (2.1) directly
to calculate the risk-based capital of Z as
ρ(−Z) = ρ(−U + ηρ(−Z)) = ρ(−U) + ηρ(−Z) .
Solving this with respect to ρ(−Z), we arrive at Equation (2.2).
2.3 Capital allocation and capital aggregation
For various purposes ranging from management structure to risk and performance mea-
surement, insurance companies group their business into sub-portfolios consisting of
business of similar risk characteristics, known as “lines of business”. For company-level
risk and performance management the quantification of the contribution of risk-based
capital at the sub-portfolio level to the overall risk capital, or vice versa, the allocation
of overall risk-based capital to a sub-portfolio, is fundamental. For a review of capital
allocation principles see for example [27] and the references therein.
Consider the case of a simplified non-life insurer. We want to split its business with
underwriting profit Z given in (2.1) into n ∈ N business lines. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n} their
underwriting profit should be given by
Zi = Ui − ηRBCZ(Zi) , (2.4)
5
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where U =
∑n
i=1 Ui and RBCZ(Zi) stands for the allocated risk-based capital of Zi, but
with respect to the total economic profit Z. Here, we explicitly choose the Conditional
Expected Shortfall,
RBCZ(Zi) = CESα,−Z(−Zi) . (2.5)
So the risk-based capital of Zi is allocated dependent on its contribution to the overall
risk. However, to ensure that we have indeed Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi, we must have RBC(Z) =∑n
i=1 RBCZ(Zi). The two lemmas in Appendix A.1 show that the Conditional Ex-
pected Shortfall is indeed consistent with our requirements.
In a strict sense, allocating capital is only meaningful for risks that are pooled in a single
portfolio, or on the balance sheet of a single insurer. Only in this case, diversification
effects materialise economically through reducing capital costs. If individual insurance
companies are considered which operate on a standalone basis, then diversification
may be present in the risk they underwrite. However, from an economic perspective
this diversification may not be realised as capital costs are incurred at the level of
individual insurers. Thus, rather than considering an individual insurer we consider a
network of insurers each determining its risk-based capital RBC(Zi) on a standalone










RBC(Zi) =: RBCNetwork , (2.6)
where RBCMarket denotes the risk-based capital for a situation in which all risks are
pooled, the market portfolio, and RBCNetwork stands for the sum of standalone risk-
based capital. The inequality in (2.6) implies that the aggregated standalone capi-
tal cannot be less than the risk-based capital RBCMarket for fully pooled risks. The
difference RBCNetwork − RBCMarket is non-negative and it is related to the diversifi-
cation achieved by the network of insurance companies relative to the overall market
portfolio. The higher the diversification achieved by the insurers in the network, the
lower this difference. Full diversification relative to the market portfolio is reached if
RBCNetwork − RBCMarket = 0.













(Pi − Li)− ηRBCMarket ,




Pi − Li − ηRBC(Zi) =
n∑
i=1
(Pi − Li)− ηRBCNetwork .




E [Pi − Li]−ηRBCMarket ≥
n∑
i=1
E [Pi − Li − ηRBC(Zi)] = E[ZNetwork] .
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The difference between E[ZMarket] and E[ZNetwork] is driven by the level of diversification
achieved by the insurance companies which are part of the network and is equal to





This means that E[ZMarket]− E[ZNetwork] is the difference in the cost of capital for the
fully diversified market portfolio and the sum of the standalone cost of capital at the
level of individual insurance companies. The question then arises whether risk transfer
between insurers can improve profitability at the level of individual insurers and the
network as a whole. To answer this question, the economics of risk transfer needs to
be clarified.
3 Risk transfer across a network of insurers
Pooling and sharing risk generally increases diversification and thus may reduce risk-
based capital and related capital costs. Beyond risk management purposes and meeting
capital constraints, transferring risk may also be driven by purely economic considera-
tions as for an insurer the cost of transferring risk may be lower than the cost of keeping
the risk on its balance sheet. Assuming an adequate premium for risk transfer is paid,
a “win-win situation”, whereby both parties increase their profitability, can occur. In
essence, risk transfer will enable insurers to access and share the diversification inherent
to the network.
3.1 Risk transfer network
Risk transfer usually takes place between an insurer and a reinsurer. We adopt the
more general view that insurance companies can transfer risk between themselves. In
practice, this situation occurs if insurance companies participate in passive reinsurance,
that is, transferring risk to a reinsurer, active reinsurance, that is, accepting risk from
another insurer, or in insurance groups which optimise capital requirements by internal
risk transfer.
Including risk transfer into the model of the simplified non-life insurer introduced in
Section 2.2, the underwriting profit after risk transfer is given by
Z? = U − ηRBC(Z?) = P − L+R− P ? − ηRBC(Z?) ,
where R represents the reinsurance recoveries due to risk transfer and P ? is the rein-
surance premium paid for the risk transfer.
To structure the problem, we represent our network of insurers by a graph. The vertices
of the graph represent the insurers and the edges represent their risk transfers. For each
risk transfer related quantity we use two indices, i and j, to indicate the direction of
risk transfer. The first index denotes the risk assuming party and the second index the
risk ceding party. For example, P ?ij denotes the premium that insurer j pays insurer
i, whereas Rij denotes the recovery that insurer i pays insurer j. See Figure 1 for an
illustration. The arrows indicate the direction of the risk transfer.
7
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Figure 1: System of insurers and network of risk transfer.
3.2 The price of transferring risk
Principles defining the cost of risk transfer are generally referred to as premium prin-
ciples. Most premium principles split the premium into the expected loss originating
from risk transfer and the loading. Common loadings principles are, for example,
the Expected Value principle or the Variance principle. For a review see for exam-
ple C. Daykin, T. Pentikainen, and M. Pesonen [9] and for the broader context see
M. Dacorogna [8]. In line with economic principles laid out in Section 2.2, we define
the loading as the additional cost of capital incurred due to the risk transfer by the
risk accepting party. Notice that by this definition, it is the risk accepting party which
defines the price for risk transfer. This is a simplification as in reality, pricing of risk
transfer is often negotiated by the risk transferring and risk accepting parties.
Following concepts discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, the net underwriting profit
of the risk accepting insurer i after risk transfer from insurer j is
Z?i = Zi + P
?
ij −Rij − ηRBCZ?i (P
?
ij −Rij) . (3.1)
The risk-based capital RBCZ?i allocated to the risk transfer from insurer j to i relative
to the profit Z?i is defined as
RBCZ?i (P
?
ij −Rij) = CESα,−Z?i (Rij − P
?
ij) . (3.2)
Based on the discussion above and Equation (3.1), we define the premium for risk
transfer as
P ?ij = E[Rij ] + ηRBCZ?i (P
?
ij −Rij) .
This premium principle states that the premium P ?ij for the risk transfer from insurer j
to insurer i is equal to the expected loss due to paid recoveries E[Rij ] plus the loading
ηRBCZ?i (P
?
ij −Rij). The latter reflects the incurred capital costs for the risk accepting
insurer i. Together with Equation (3.2) and the linearity of the Conditional Expected
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3.3 Proportional risk transfer
While risk transfer can take proportional and non-proportional forms, all relations in
Section 3.2 are of general form. For the sake of simplicity and analytical tractability,
we will consider the case of proportional risk transfer here. If non-proportionality is
assumed, analytical expressions (Equation (3.4) to Equation (3.7)) for non-proportional
risk transfer are not readily available. However, because of the universality of our
approach, a numerical evaluation is feasible and it is left for later work. Here, parties
transfer proportions of their risk exposures for an adequate premium. Proportional risk
transfer can be characterised by one parameter, the proportion of risk that is ceded
from one to another party or the related retention of risk that is kept.
To increase readability, we will omit the boundaries of the running variable when sum-






where Ji = {j ∈ N | 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i}.
For a network of n ∈ N insurers mutually transferring risk, the proportional risk transfer
can be represented by an (n×n) - matrix C ∈ [0, 1]n×n. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 6= j, let
Cij denote the portion of the risk Lj insurer j is transferring to insurer i, or equivalently,
the proportion of risk Lj the insurer i is accepting from insurer j. Furthermore, set
Cii = 1−
∑
















Notice that the matrix C satisfies the following properties.
• Rij(C) = CijLj (for i 6= j) corresponds to losses incurred by insurer i due to risk
transfer from insurer j to insurer i.
• Rji(C) = CjiLi (for i 6= j) corresponds to recoveries received by insurer i due to
risk transfer from insurer i to insurer j.
• Elements Cii = 1 −
∑
j 6=iCji represent the retention levels for risk Li of insurer
i. Assuming that no shorting of risk positions is possible, we have
∑
j 6=iCji ≤ 1
and Cii ≥ 0.
• For each insurer i we have
∑n
j=1Cji = 1.
Notice that the matrix C can be decomposed into the adjacency matrix characterising
risk transfer where the diagonal elements are equal to zero, and the diagonal matrix
representing risk retention.
The net underwriting profit of insurer i ∈ {1, . . . , n} taking into account all risk transfer
9
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is given by
Z?i (C) = Pi − L?i (C)−
∑
j 6=i
(P ?ji(C)− P ?ij(C))− ηRBC(Z?i (C)) , (3.5)
where the total net loss L?i (C) incurred by insurer i is the operational loss adjusted by
the received and paid recoveries,






















P ?ij(C) and P
?
ji(C) are defined as in Equation (3.3). In analogy to Remark 2.2, we






L?i (C)− Pi +
∑
j 6=i
(P ?ji(C)− P ?ij(C))
)
. (3.7)
Notice that we use the Expected Shortfall as we are considering the situation of a single
insurer.
Expressions (3.5) and (3.7) are fundamental. They describe the economics of propor-
tional risk transfer and related capital requirements at the level of individual insurer i
as well as for the network itself. In line with (2.6), the overall amount of capital held










is the total expected net underwriting profit generated by all insurers part of the net-
work.
4 Optimising risk transfer
Risk transfer affects the profitability of risk exchanging parties as demonstrated in
(3.1) and it also impacts the overall profitability of the network in (3.8). This gives
rise to a series of questions. Can risk transfer be optimised such that it benefits all risk
exchanging parties and the network overall? Will all parties be able to maximise their
profitability through risk transfer? Is there a unique “optimal” or “fair” solution?
10
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4.1 The network perspective
There are in principle two different approaches to investigate the questions from above.
The first approach relies on agent-based models where risk pricing plays the role of a
utility function. The second approach depends on network-based models that describe
dependencies and interactions between market participants from a more global point
of view. We take the latter perspective and start our analysis from the expressions
(3.5) and (3.7). Consider the maximisation problem of the profitability of the network




This maximisation problem can be simplified by observing that the overall amount of
premiums paid for risk transfer amongst the insurers disappears. The reason for this is
that the network is closed, that is, any premium paid by an insurer will be received by
another. Furthermore, we notice that the aggregate total loss of all insurers after risk
transfer is equal to the overall gross loss.







Pi − Li − ηRBC(Z?i (C)) .










i (C))− Pi .
Proof. We start with the sum over Z?i (C) as given in Equation (3.5). For the sake of















(P ?ji(C)− P ?ij(C)) = 0 . (4.2)
For the loss we start with Equation (3.6), exchange the sums, and use the fact that for
all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
∑n


















The last assertion follows from Equation (3.7) and the translation property of the
Expected Shortfall together with Equation (4.2).
With help of Lemma 4.1 we can now restate the maximisation problem of E[Z?Network(C)]
as a minimisation problem of the overall risk-based capital RBC?Network(C). Indeed, we
11














Pi − E[Li]− η min
C∈[0,1]n×n
RBC?Network(C) .




In analogy to Equation (2.6), RBCMarket is a lower bound to our minimisation problem.
























In terms of the optimisation in (4.3), the question can be restated. How should the risk
be shared amongst the insurers such that RBC?Network(C) = RBCMarket? To answer






















is also a minimiser of RBC?Network(C). The set of solutions to Equation (4.5) is given
by {
C ∈ [0, 1]n×n





This can be seen from the following short calculation, where we use positive homo-




i=1Cij = 1, for any
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The set of solutions in (4.6) represents the first main result of this paper. It has a
straightforward interpretation: the profitability at network level is optimised if after
risk transfer all insurance companies hold a share of the market portfolio. In this
situation, the sum of standalone risk-based capital corresponds to the overall risk-
based capital of the market portfolio. This is a plausible and intuitive result. However,
it should be kept in mind that it has been derived on the back of a consistent model of
risk transfer realistically reflecting economics of capital costs.





j 6=1 cj c1 . . . c1
c2 1−
∑n








where c1, . . . , cn ∈ [0, 1] are constants such that
∑n
i=1 ci = 1. This is an equation with n
unknowns and consequently, there is no unique solution. An additional n−1 constraints
will determine risk transfer unambiguously. From a practical perspective, the natural
choice for the constraints is the capital available to support risk-based capital at the
level of individual insurers. Such an approach reflects economic reality with limited
capital available to support risk taking. Notice that following this approach, for one
insurer the risk-based capital is determined implicitly. In economic terms, this insurer
would need to adjust its capital base to ensure the overall network after risk transfer
is adequately capitalised. This function of providing capital support to a network
of insurance companies through risk transfer is typically performed by reinsurers. In
Figure 1, this is illustrated by “I 4”.
4.2 Unique, fair and optimal solution
As demonstrated in Section 4.1, there is no unique solution for the maximisation prob-
lem of the network without additional constraints, but rather a set of solutions. This
raises the question whether one of these solutions can be regarded as “better” or “fair”
towards all the insurers? In the following, we answer this question by applying princi-
ples of cooperative game theory to identify a unique fair solution for risk transfer. To
this end, we follow the concept of fairness developed by M. Denault [12].
In more detail, Denault develops an approach to allocate risk-based capital between sub-
portfolios of one single company. He considers coalitional games with fractional players
for general coherent risk measures and identifies a unique fair allocation. We show
that this fair allocation concept defines a unique, fair, and optimal risk transfer scheme
C f for a network of different insurance companies. In what follows, we will briefly
explain the framework and demonstrate that the risk transfer scheme C f results in an
allocation of standalone risk-based capital that equals the Aumann-Shapley allocation.
In the sense of Denault, this is considered fair and optimal.
Consider a coalitional game with fractional players (N,Λ, Rρ) consisting of
• a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N of players with |N | = n, where in our case each
player corresponds to a portfolio of an insurer,
13
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• a positive vector Λ ∈ [0, 1]n, where each element Λi represents the maximal
possible involvement of player i ∈ N , and
• a risk measure function Rρ : [0, 1]n → R with λ 7→ Rρ(λ) such that Rρ(0) = 0.
So each player represents the portfolio of an insurer i which is characterised by Zi,
the profit distribution. The vector Λ ∈ [0, 1]n represents the maximal portion of each





We introduce another vector λ ∈ [0, 1]n, λ ≤ Λ, which defines the level of actual
involvement of each player in the coalition. So the ratio λiΛi gives the proportion of the
actual to the maximal involvement of player i ∈ N .
For fixed random variables {Zi}i∈{1,..,n}, we define the risk measure function associated
with a coherent risk measure ρ as Rρ : [0, 1]









Notice that Rρ(Λ) = ρ(−Z). The notion of coherency can be extended to these risk
measure functions, see [12, Definition 11]. However, we will only need positive homo-
geneity, that is, for all γ > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1]n we have Rρ(γλ) = γRρ(λ). This follows
directly from the positive homogeneity of the coherent risk measure ρ.
Following Denault, we introduce the notion of fuzzy values. These are maps ϕ which
assign to each coalitional game with fractional players (N,Λ, Rρ) a unique per unit
allocation vector,
ϕ : (N,Λ, Rρ) 7→
(
ϕ1(N,Λ, Rρ), . . . , ϕn(N,Λ, Rρ)
)ᵀ ∈ Rn ,
such that
Λᵀϕ(N,Λ, Rρ) = Rρ(Λ) .
The concept of coherency is then further extended for fuzzy values and the implications
for the fairness of these allocations are discussed. For the exact definition and the
justification see [12, Definition 13] and the subsequent discussion.
A well known coherent fuzzy value is the Aumann-Shapley value.3 Given the existence
of the partial derivative of Rρ in direction λi, ∂λiRρ, it is for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} defined as




So the per unit allocation is the mean of the marginal risk of the i-th insurer as the
involvement of all insurers increases uniformly from 0 to 1. Using the fact that for a
3For a proof of the coherency of the Aumann-Shapley value see [12, Corollary 1].
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differentiable, k–homogeneous function f : Rn → R, that means, for all γ > 0, x ∈ Rn
we have f(γx) = γkf(x), any of its partial derivatives are (k − 1)–homogeneous, we
can simplify the integral from above. Since the risk measure function Rρ is positively
homogeneous, that means 1–homogeneous, we get
ϕASi (N,Λ, Rρ) = ∂λiRρ(Λ)
∫ 1
0
1 dγ = ∂λiRρ(Λ) .
This corresponds to the Euler allocation principle. The resulting per portfolio allocation
is the gradient of Rρ evaluated at the maximal presence level Λ,
ϕAS(N,Λ, Rρ) = ∇Rρ(Λ) .
This gradient is the Aumann-Shapley risk allocation. It refers to the amount of risk
allocated to each portfolio when Λ = [1, . . . , 1]ᵀ ∈ Rn.
Hence, choosing Λ = [1, . . . , 1]ᵀ ∈ Rn and the Expected Shortfall, ρ = ESα, we get
RBC(Z) = ESα(−Z) = RESα(Λ).
Therefore, the resulting risk capital allocation is
RBCZ(Zi) = ϕ
AS









This expression can be simplified. Indeed, the Aumann-Shapley allocation with the
Expected Shortfall as the risk measure corresponds to the allocation scheme based on
the Conditional Expected Shortfall.












Proof. A proof is given in [25, Proposition 2.1, Lemma A.1]. Compare also D. Tasche
[26].
Using Proposition 4.2 and Equation (4.7) with Λ = (1, . . . , 1)ᵀ ∈ Rn yields
RBCZ(Zi) = CESα,−Z(−Zi).
Following Section 4.1, the maximisers of the optimisation in (4.1) are the solutions
of Equation (4.5) and only depend on losses before risk transfer, Li, and after risk
transfer, L?i . Thus, let the n insurers be represented by their gross loss amounts Li and
the gross loss amount of the grand coalition be represented by the network itself. Using
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Assuming again Λ = (1, . . . , 1)ᵀ ∈ Rn, the resulting Aumann Shapley allocation,
ϕASi (N,Λ, RESα) = CESα,LNetwork(Li) , (4.8)
is the fair risk allocation to insurer i. From Section 4.1 we know that the optimal risk
transfer C f belongs to the set{
C ∈ [0, 1]n×n





and it is fair if the retained risk L?i after risk transfer equals the fair risk allocation in
(4.8). Therefore, the optimal and fair risk transfer C f is determined by the solution of
the equation
C fii ESα(LNetwork) = CESα,LNetwork(Li) ,





where both CESα,LNetwork(Li) and ESα(LNetwork) are assumed to be positive. Equa-
tion (4.9) is the second main result of this paper. It defines a unique, fair and optimal
solution for the risk transfer C f across the network. This solution can be understood
as defining risk transfer such that the diversification present at network level is effec-
tively and efficiently allocated in a fair, optimal and unique way to individual insurers.
As such the solution ensures that the positive impact of diversification on economic
profitability is realised at the level of individual insurers in a fair and optimal way.
5 Impact of risk transfer on systemic risk
The network approach to risk transfer developed in this paper lends itself naturally
to an analysis of systemic risk. Our framework can shed light on a range of aspects
of systemic risk, including interconnectedness, complexity, and resilience at the level
of individual insurance companies and the network itself. While a subsequent paper
will analyse systemic risk in more detail, here we just highlight three critical aspects
directly linked to risk transfer, sharing risk and diversification.
• Firstly, we notice that sharing risk and diversification through risk transfer will
distribute risk across the network and thereby improve resilience at the level of
individual insurers.
• On the other hand, we observe that risk transfer is increasing interconnectedness
and may thus contribute to systemic risk itself.
• Lastly, we note that the optimisation of risk transfer through increasing diversifi-
cation at the level of individual insurers may lead to a reduction of overall capital
requirements.
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Figure 2: The graph visualises capital redundancy as defined by Equation (5.1). The
R12 and R21 axes represent the level of risk retention of the first and second insurer,
respectively.
The impact of optimisation of risk transfer on capital requirements at network level
as compared to the capital requirement at market level is illustrated best by Equa-




describes how close the network is to optimal risk transfer. At the same time it also
describes capital redundancy of the network relative to the market. See Figure 2 for a
visual illustration. The graph illustrates Equation (5.1) as a function of different risk
retention levels. For this we simulated the losses of two insurers. We assume that the
losses have the same log-normal distribution and that they are independent. For each
retention level pair we evaluate Equation (5.1). One can clearly see that the optimal
risk retention pairs lie on the diagonal line connecting the points (0, 1) and (1, 0) on
the xy-plane, as predicted in Section 4. In contrast, if both insurers either do not
participate in risk transfer, point (1, 1), or decide to just swap their losses, point (0, 0),
the network is furthest away from the optimum.
Optimising risk transfer reduces the ratio which means overall capital remaining at
network level is reduced. From the point of systemic risk this may indicate that through
optimising risk transfer, systemic risk is increased as the overall capital available at
network level to cope with a systemic stress event is reduced.
Optimisation of risk transfer on the other hand leads to each insurance company of the
network holding a fraction of the total market portfolio. Risk, including systemic risk,
is shared evenly across all insurance companies preventing concentration of systemic
risk at level of a single insurance company thereby increasing resilience. However,
risk transfer is increasing interconnectedness. As a result, a systemic event through
optimised risk transfer can impact the whole network thereby increasing systemic risk.
Further analysis is needed to understand in more detail these competing effects of op-
timised risk transfer on systemic risk exposure and resilience at network level. Such an
analysis will have to distinguish between idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk factors and
their role in the optimisation of risk transfer through optimally sharing diversification.
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6 Conclusions and outlook
Risk transfer is a risk and capital management tool which enables insurers to meet
capital and risk appetite constraints. At the same time, risk transfer is also a tool
to enhance performance as it can balance portfolios and thereby improve risk-return
characteristics. For a single insurer, optimising risk transfer essentially means trading-
off the cost of risk transfer to mitigated loss potential and reduced capital costs.
For a network of insurers, optimising risk transfer is less evident as optimisation can
take different perspectives. To analyse this we considered risk transfer in the context of
a network of insurance companies. Prompted by supervisory frameworks as, for exam-
ple, Solvency II or SST requiring insurers to quantify risk-based capital using prescribed
modelling principles and risk measures, a common, realistic, and economical premium
principle is applied. Assuming an equal risk appetite and capital cost for all insurers,
there is, in general, no solution which maximises the profitability of all insurance com-
panies in the network. However, there is a set of solutions which maximise the overall
profitability at the network level. These solutions are characterised by risk transfer
such that all insurers hold a proportion of the market portfolio. The analysis also
demonstrates that additional constraints will determine risk transfer unambiguously.
Absent of additional constraints cooperative game theory defines a unique, fair and
optimal solution related to coherent risk allocation principles based on the Aumann
Shapley value developed in [12]. This solution defines risk transfer such that the di-
versification present at network level is effectively and efficiently allocated in a fair,
optimal, and unique way to individual insurers.
In practice, the fair and optimal solution defined by the Aumann Shapley value can
be realised closest for insurance groups. Reason for this is that for insurance groups
there exists an overarching rationale to optimise profitability not only at the level of
individual insurance companies, but at the level of the insurance group itself. Thus,
insurers which are part of the group are directly incentivised to form coalitions in terms
of risk transfer that optimises profitability at the group level. The solution defined
by the Aumann Shapley value not only optimises profitability, but also is fair in the
sense that it recognises the contribution to group level diversification and through risk
transfer efficiently allocates it back to individual insurers. It should be noted that the
realisation of group level diversification through risk transfer instruments is the only
way to recognise diversification under supervisory frameworks building on risk-based
capital quantification. In this context, the interplay of optimal ownership structure and
optimal risk transfer remains a topic for further analysis.
A related topic for further research is the impact of risk transfer on systemic risk. The
network approach to risk transfer developed in this paper sheds light on a wide range
of aspects of systemic risk, including in particular interconnectedness, complexity, and
resilience at the level of individual insurance companies and the network itself. There
are two critical facets to this. Firstly, sharing risk and diversification through risk
transfer will distribute risk across the network and thereby improve resilience at the level
of individual insurers. Risk transfer, on the other hand, is increasing interconnectedness
and may thus contribute to systemic risk itself. The optimisation of risk transfer
discussed in this paper may lead to a reduction of overall capital supporting risk and
thus increase systemic risk exposure accordingly. Connecting concepts developed in
the present paper with related research like [2] and [13] is a possible starting point to
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further investigate these and related questions.
A Appendices
A.1 Proofs of Section 2
The following lemmas show that with the choices in (2.4) and (2.5) our requirements
described in Section 2.3 are satisfied. In analogy to Lemma 2.1, we get the following
result.





Proof. Using Equation (2.4), Equation (2.5), and the linearity of the conditional ex-
pectation, we get
RBCZ(Zi) = CESα,−Z(−Ui + ηRBCZ(Zi)) = CESα,−Z(−Ui) + ηRBCZ(Zi) .
Solving for RBCZ(Zi) yields the result.
Furthermore, the Conditional Expected Shortfall defines an additive risk-based capital.
Lemma A.2. With the choices in (2.4) and (2.5) we get
n∑
i=1
RBCZ(Zi) = RBC(Z) .
Proof. Applying Lemma A.1 in the first equality and using the linearity of the condi-












Notice that by cash-additivity of the Value at Risk and Lemma 2.1 the condition
−Z ≥ VaRα(−Z) is equivalent to −U ≥ VaRα(−U). Hence,
CESα,−Z(−U) = CESα,−U (−U) = ESα(−U) .
Applying Lemma A.1 again yields the result.
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